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BIAS IN THE BOARDROOM: IMPLICIT BIAS 
IN THE SELECTION AND TREATMENT OF 
WOMEN DIRECTORS 
DEBBIE A. THOMAS*
In light of the stagnation in growth of women directors on corporate 
boards, board diversity advocates and corporate leaders should look to the role 
implicit gender bias plays in the board nomination process and in challenges 
women directors face while serving on boards.  Relevant stakeholders often 
overlook how implicit bias barriers prevent women from reaching the 
boardroom and persist as obstacles once women directors have earned their 
seats on the board.  Incorporating social psychological research on implicit 
bias and recognized strategies to work around bias, such as objective 
assessments and guidelines, data analytics, and accountability mechanisms, 
this Article encourages companies to offer tailored, research-oriented implicit 
bias trainings to directors and corporate executives to tackle bias concerns.  It 
also suggests modifications to the SEC board diversity disclosure rule to 
account for the effect of implicit gender bias and advocates collaborative action 
within companies—including voluntary targets and diversity task forces—to 
address impediments to women’s advancement in leadership. 
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³Too often we are resigned to what happens in the blink of an eye.  It doesn’t 
seem like we have much control over whatever bubbles to the surface from our 
unconscious.  But we do, and if we can control the environment in which rapid 
cognition takes place, then we can control rapid cognition.´1
Malcolm Gladwell 
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the number of women appointed to Fortune 500 boards declined 
by 2%, reversing a seven-year trend of growth.2  Despite increasing efforts to 
achieve gender parity on corporate boards, progress in moving the needle has 
been slow.3  This disappointing trend presents challenges in closing the gender 
1. MALCOM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 252 (2005).   
2. Jena McGregor, The Number of New Female Board Members Actually Dropped Last Year,
WASH. POST (June 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-
leadership/wp/2017/06/19/the-number-of-new-female-board-members-actually-dropped-last-
year/?utm_term=.0875db076b58 [https://perma.cc/W96X-ZJ2Y].  
3. Ernst & Young reported in 2015 that women held only 16% of board seats of S&P 1500 
companies, which is less than the percent of seats held by directors with the names John, Robert, James, 
and William. EY Ctr. for Bd. Matters, Women on US Boards: What Are We Seeing?, ERNST & YOUNG
(Feb.  2015), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-
_Women_on_US_boards:_what_are_we_seeing/%24FILE/EY-women-on-us-boards-what-are-we-
seeing.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVW8-4RAZ ] [hereinafter Women on US Boards: What Are We Seeing]; 
Claire Cain Miller et al., The Top Jobs Where Women Are Outnumbered by Men Named John, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/24/upshot/women-and-men-
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leadership gap.  It also exposes unconscious gender bias as part of the persisting 
problem.  
Scientific research and public awareness of unconscious or implicit bias 
have grown dramatically in recent years.4  At the same time, efforts to combat 
implicit bias have largely focused on hiring and workplace behavior, not 
corporate governance.5  Corporate leaders tend to overlook the effect of implicit 
bias on board diversity and advancement opportunities for women in 
leadership.6  And while advocates strive to make the case for board diversity, 
they often fail to address the underlying barrier of implicit bias, which precludes 
a gender-neutral process in the first place. 
This Article argues that U.S. scholars, lawmakers, and members of the 
business community should shift their focus to how bias preempts a gender-
neutral nomination process and holds women directors back.7  Implicit gender 
bias affects both the director nomination process and the challenges women 
directors face in the boardroom.8  As such, I suggest addressing implicit bias  
through recognized strategies and methods aimed at reducing and working 
around bias to better ensure all qualified candidates have a fair opportunity to 
serve on boards.  One key way that U.S. companies can do this is by offering 
implicit bias trainings to directors and officers and implementing measures such 
as targets and task forces to help reduce bias.  Companies have an incentive to 
have qualified individuals serving as their leaders.  Accordingly, they also have 
an incentive to eliminate barriers preventing capable individuals from realizing 
that opportunity.  
Part II of this Article begins by examining the underrepresentation of 
women on boards of U.S. companies.  It considers rationales for diversity, the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure rule about 
diversity, and two issues affecting women board candidates and directors: the 
pool problem and tokenism.  Part II also addresses the stagnation in the growth 
of women directors.  While many advocates emphasize business and moral 
rationales for diversity in order to address this stagnation, they often fail to 
UHFRJQL]HLPSOLFLWELDVDVDFULWLFDOEDUULHUWRZRPHQ¶VUHSUHVHntation on boards.   
named-john.html [https://perma.cc/NW6G-3F63].  While this number has since increased to 19%, 
women continue to face obstacles in gaining representation. Women on US Boards: What Are We 
Seeing, supra; Miller et al., supra.
4. See PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://www.projectimplicit.net/index.html [https://perma.cc/UU75-
9P94] (last visited Dec. 12, 2017). 
5. See infra Section III.C.  
6. Infra Section II.C. 
7. While issues of racial and ethnic diversity as well as other marginalized identities are also 
critical, the focus of this Article is the underrepresentation of women on boards of U.S. companies.  
8. Infra Section III.C. 
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To further explain the concept of implicit bias, Part III gathers insights from 
social psychology and summarizes research on interventions that may reduce 
bias and other tools to work around it.  Then, Part III explores how implicit bias 
manifests in the board nomination process and in the challenges women 
directors face in the boardroom.  
Part IV proposes three complementary ways to reduce implicit bias in 
selecting nominees and in the treatment of women directors, taking into account 
recognized strategies to reduce bias and its effects, including trainings, 
objective assessments and guidelines, accountability mechanisms, and 
increased exposure to counter-stereotypic exemplars.  First, companies should 
offer voluntary implicit bias trainings to directors and officers.  Second, the 
SEC should amend its disclosure rule to define diversity to include gender 
diversity, and to require disclosure of the demographic identities of directors 
and officers.  The rule should also require companies to disclose whether they 
offer implicit bias trainings to directors and officers as part of a diversity policy.  
Third, companies should implement voluntary targets and task forces to address 
implicit gender bias concerns.  
II. MISGUIDED EFFORTS AND THE GENDER-BIASED PROCESS
Despite efforts to increase gender diversity and the SEC board diversity 
rule, growth of women on boards has stalled.  Part II of this Article explains 
why a shift is necessary.  Section II.A describes two justifications for board 
diversity²the business case and the moral case²and how they form the basis 
for most efforts to increase diversity.  Section II.B assesses one such effort, the 
SEC board diversity disclosure rule, which expressly relied on the business case 
but problematically lHIW WKH WHUP ³GLYHUVLW\´ XQGHILQHG  (YHQ DIWHU WKH
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI WKH6(&¶VGLVFORVXUH UXOHJURZWK LQJHQGHUGLYHUVLW\KDV
been slow.  As discussed in Section II.C, one problem is that the dominant 
rationales for diversity seek to increase the number of women on boards without 
first fixing inherently gender-biased structures.  Finally, Section II.D analyzes 
how the pool problem and tokenism also point to implicit bias.  
A.  Rationales for Board Diversity 
/HJDOVFKRODUVUHFRJQL]HWKHERDUG¶VFHQWUDOUROe in corporate governance.9
6WDWH FRUSRUDWH ODZV SURYLGH WKDW WKH ³EXVLQHVV DQG DIIDLUV RI HYHU\
9. See Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary: Puzzles About Corporate Boards and Board 
Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 841, 842±GLVFXVVLQJWKUHH³SUHYDLOLQJDFFRXQWV´IRUZKat boards 
do, given the apparent tension between the theories of board primacy and managerial primacy); see
also Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate 
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corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors.´10  In addition, the board performs essential functions.  It plays an 
advisory role11 and monitors managers.12  It also operates as a group of peers 
making decisions together, which psychology suggests produces better 
decisions on issues that require judgment.13  In light of the importance of the 
board, selection of directors is critical.14
Two main rationales justify efforts to bring more diverse directors on 
boards:  the business case and the moral case.  The business case contends that 
diversity creates better governance, which makes the business more 
profitable.15  This rationale has dominated the conversation about diversifying 
the board.16  However, evidence for the business case in terms of financial 
results is mixed and inconclusive.17  Various studies have found both a positive 
relationship and a negative (or no significant) relationship in this regard.18
Other more promising strands of the business case invoke evidence that 
diversity improves a FRPSDQ\¶V SHUIRUPDQFH WKURXJK HQKDQFHG
decision-making and positive corporate image.19  A diverse board may improve 
Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2014); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder 
Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 679±80 (2007). 
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS¶N,
amended 2005).   
11. Langevoort, supra note 9, at 844.  
12. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of 
Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 101 (2004); Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1053 (citing 
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
6, 84±89 (1932)).   
13. Gevurtz, supra note 12, at 94, 96.   
14. See Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1053±³7KHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHERDUGRI
directors is further illustrated by the considerable extent to which academics hoping to improve 
FRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHIRFXVRQWKHUROHDQGFRPSRVLWLRQRIWKHERDUG´ Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 
679±80 (discussing the central role of the board, including selecting the CEO and other executives and 
making major corporate decisions). 
15. David A. Carter et al., The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of U.S. Boards and Board 
Committees and Firm Financial Performance, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT¶L REV. 396, 397 
(2010). 
16. Even the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the business case for diversity in its affirmative 
action jurisprudence. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326, 330 (2003) (holding that diversity is 
a compelling state interest justifying the use of race in admissions to public universities because the 
³EHQHILWV WKDW IORZ IURP VWXGHQW ERG\ GLYHUVLW\´ LQFOXGH SURPRWLQJ OHDUQLQJ RXWFRPHV and better 
preparing students to become professionals).  
17. Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much 
Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 383 (2014). 
18. Id. at 384±90. 
19. Id. at 396, 399. 
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decision-making because heterogeneous perspectives can lead to more 
thorough analysis.20  Likewise, a diverse board may signal to consumers that 
the firm embodies equal opportunity and progressiveness.21  Still, even with 
regard to these strands of the business case, Deborah Rhode and Amanda Packel 
conclude that empirical evidence can vary.22   
On the other hand, the moral case holds that based on equity and fairness, 
more competent women and minorities deserve the opportunity to sit on 
corporate boards.23  Those who extol the mRUDO FDVH DVVHUW ³YDOXHV VXFK DV
fairness, justice, and equal opportunity, as well as the symbolic message it sends 
WRFRUSRUDWHVWDNHKROGHUV´24  Apart from the bottom line, they also emphasize 
normative frameworks, including antidiscrimination norms and values 
underlying our laws.25
However, as described in Section II.C, the dominant rationales are often 
misguided.  Both focus on producing more gender diversity without first 
recognizing how bias taints the nomination process itself and prevents qualified 
women from earning board seats.  
B.  The SEC Rule 
In response to concerns about board diversity, the SEC promulgated a rule 
in 2009 that amended Regulation S-K to require companies to disclose whether 
the board nominating committee considers diversity in identifying nominees.26
20. Id. at 396.  Research has shown that a diverse board with a variety of perspectives and 
backgrounds can combDWDSV\FKRORJLFDOSKHQRPHQRQNQRZQDVJURXSWKLQN LQZKLFK³DGHFLVLRQ-
making group is so cohesive that its members become reluctant to criticize . . . the judgments and ideas 
RIWKHLUFROOHDJXHVDQGOHDGHUV´.LPEHUO\'.UDZLHFHWDOThe Danger of Difference: Tensions in 
Directors’ Views of Corporate Board Diversity, 2013 ILL. L. REV. 919, 930±35.  Interestingly, while 
many directors report their belief in the need to avoid groupthink, they also emphasize the importance 
of collegiality. Id. 
21. Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is 
Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 448 (2008). 
22. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 17, at 397, 399, 401.  
23. See Carter et al., supra note 15, at 397 (contrasting the positions of those who believe boards 
VKRXOGEHPRUHGLYHUVH³EHFDXVHLWLVWKHULJKW thing to do and those who think [boards] should be more 
diverse because it actuall\HQKDQFHVVKDUHKROGHUYDOXH´
24. Rhode & Packel, supra note 17, at 401.  The Grutter Court also noted that diversity is 
important because it can help reduce racial stereotypes. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326, 330 
(2003).  
25. James A. Fanto et al., Justifying Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 901, 930±31 (2011).  In a 
sense, counteracting implicit bias could fall into the category of moral or social rationales because it 
invokes antidiscrimination norms, as well as the need for fairness. See id. at 930 n.133 (citing Jerry 
Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action´
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1075 (2006)).  
26. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2009).   
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The rule also requires the company to disclose whether the nominating 
committee or board has a policy with regard to diversity and the selection of 
nominees.27  Unlike other countries whose regulatory approaches employ 
quotas or the sWURQJHU ³FRPSO\ RU H[SODLQ´ GLVFORVXUH DSSURDFK 86 ODZ
imposes no affirmative obligation to consider diversity, and only requires 
disclosing whether or not the company considers it.28
The SEC relied on both the financial and better governance strands of the 
business case as justification for the rule.29  In explaining its reasons for 
implementing the rule, the SEC cited a positive relationship between diverse 
boards and corporate financial performance.30  It also explained that board 
diversity is important to some investors because more diverse directors may 
increase independence and improve decision-making.31
Notably, the rule does not require companies to specify the gender, racial, 
or ethnic identities of their directors.32  The rule also does not define diversity, 
but allows companies to define it however they choose.33  One empirical study 
found that without guidance on the meaning of diversity, most companies 
define it in experiential terms.34  While the rule gives companies that flexibility, 
in doing so, it obscures the adverse effect of implicit gender bias.35  It also fails 
to shame companies into changing their conduct.   
Recognizing the shortcomings of the rule, many have suggested 
modifications to require disclosure of the sociodemographic backgrounds of 
27. Id.
28. See Angela R. Foster, Comment, A Quest to Increase Women in Corporate Board 
Leadership:  Comparing the Law in Norway and the U.S., 26 WASH. INT¶L L.J. 381, 383±84 (2017).  
Many European countries such as the United Kingdom and most of the European Union use the comply 
or explain regulatory model. See Regulatory Board Diversity, CATALYST,
http://www.catalyst.org/regulatory-board-diversity [https://perma.cc/7QZ2-LSLG] (last visited Aug. 
9, 2018). 
29. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 229). 
30. Id. at 68,334, 68,343.   
31. Id. DW   7KH 6(& VWDWHG WKH SXUSRVH RI WKH UXOHZDV WR ³HQKDQFH WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ
provided in annual reports, and proxy information statements to better enable shareholders to evaluate 
the OHDGHUVKLSRISXEOLFFRPSDQLHV´Id. at 68,334.  
32. See id. at 68,344. 
33. See id.
34. AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW,
GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY 213 (2015).  After comparing the disclosure-based model of board 
diversity regulation (e.g. United States) with target- and quota-based models (e.g. Norway), Dhir 
contends that the tendency of U.S. companies to define diversity experientially is a key flaw in the 
effectiveness of the SEC rule. Id. at 191±200, 230±32.  
35. See infra Section IV.B. 
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directors.36  Part IV of this Article will advocate this change in order to better 
recognize the role of identity-based implicit bias.  However, additional changes 
are necessary to account for the presence of implicit bias on the board.  
C.  Confronting the Stagnation 
The increasing salience of diversity concerns and the SEC disclosure rule 
have not led to a corresponding growth of women on boards.  In fact, in recent 
years, growth has stagnated.37  Between 2009 and 2012, before and after the 
adoption of the SEC rule, the number of women on Fortune 500 company 
boards grew to 16.6%, an increase of less than 2%.38  According to the nonprofit 
organization Catalyst, women still make up only 19.9% of S&P 500 boards.39   
At least one commentator, Lisa Fairfax, notes that the business case 
rationale for board diversity may have contributed to this stagnation.40  Fairfax 
explains that a strategic focus on the business case has prevented advocates 
IURP ³OHJLWLPL]>LQJ@ QRQHFRQRPLF UDWLRQDOHV IRU ERDUG GLYHUVLW\´41  She 
concludes that the overemphasis on the business case best explains the recent 
36. See Dave Michaels, SEC Drafting Rule Requiring Firms Reveal Board Diversity, WALL ST.
J. (June 28, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-drafting-rule-requiring-firms-reveal-board-
diversity-1467078153 [https://perma.cc/KU9R-;(5@GHVFULELQJIRUPHU6(&&KDLU0DU\:KLWH¶V
SXVKIRUPRUHGLVFORVXUHDERXWGLYHUVLW\DQGKHUFULWLFLVPRIWKHFXUUHQWUXOHDVOHDGLQJWR³YDJXH´
reports that have not altered board diversity numbers).  In 2017, the Advisory Committee on Small and 
Emerging Companies recommended an amendment to the disclosure rule requiring issuers to describe 
the extent to which the board of directors is diverse. Letter from Stephen M. Graham, Comm. Co-
Chair, and Sara Hanks, Comm. Co-Chair, to Michael S. Piwowar, Acting Chairman, U.S. Securities & 
([FKDQJH&RPP¶Q)HEKWWSVZZZVHFJRYLQIRVPDOOEXVDFVHFDFVHF-recommendation-
021617-coporate-board-diversity.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LVP-6UT2].  However, the Advisory 
Committee did not recommend defining diversity, stating each issuer should be free to determine its 
own definition. Id. 
37. Barbara Black, Stalled: Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 7, 8 
(2011). 
38. Foster, supra note 28, at 401. 
39. 2015 Catalyst Census: Women and Men Board Directors, CATALYST (June 14, 2016), 
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2015-catalyst-census-women-and-men-board-directors 
[https://perma.cc/22P5-89DM].  The percentage of women on boards varies depending on the size of 
the company, with larger companies having more diversity than relatively smaller ones. Women on US 
Boards: What Are We Seeing, supra note 3.  For example, in 2014, women held 22% of Fortune 100 
company board seats, 19% of S&P 500 seats, and 16% of S&P 1500 seats. Id.  The report by Ernst & 
Young also observed that many companies increased the size of the board in order to add more female 
directors. Id.
40. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C.
L. REV. 855 (2011) (examining empirical data indicating a rhetorical shift in justifying diversity in 
terms of the business case but a lack of a corresponding increase in board diversity). 
41. Id. at 884±85.  
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stagnation and that moral or social rationales may be better for addressing 
REVWDFOHVVXFKDV³LQJUDLQHGELDVHV´42
However, this Article takes a different tack.  To be sure, moral and 
economic rationales are relevant and often compelling.  Many view the rise of 
the business case as a strategic imperative, and the moral case works within the 
FRQWH[WRI³DORQJOHJDF\RIGLVFULPLQDWLRQDQGLQHTXDOLW\´43  Still, regardless 
of the rationale, the larger problem is that the board nomination process is 
affected by implicit bias against women.  Both of the dominant rationales seek 
to justify measures to increase the number of women on boards.  However, in 
order to see more women on boards, we must first address the underlying 
obstacle of implicit bias.  By working to eliminate biased structures in the first 
place, we can better ensure a gender-neutral nomination process in which 
competent candidates have a fair chance to serve on boards.  
D. The Pool Problem and Tokenism 
Understanding barriers to gender diversity also requires assessing the pool 
problem and tokenism.  Both problems are two commonly cited obstacles for 
women in accessing the board and thriving while on it.44 Importantly, both 
issues also point to the need for a board nomination process and board structure 
without bias. 
The pool problem refers to the perceived limited pool of women candidates 
for directorships, often based on adherence to traditional criteria from which 
women are excluded.45  Corporations are free to decide their own director 
42. Id. at 859, 883.  
43. /DQJHYRRUWH[SODLQVZK\WKHEXVLQHVVFDVHIRUGLYHUVLW\KDVEHFRPHDVHHPLQJO\³VWUDWegic 
QHFHVVLW\´
In a perfect world, board diversity follows naturally from the fair distribution of 
talent and skill between the genders and among ethnicities when selection is 
based on merit.  But our world is grossly imperfect, with residual bias (conscious 
and implicit), a long legacy of discrimination and inequality, and pervasive, 
artificial, and self-serving social construals of what merit-based selection means.   
Langevoort, supra note 9, at 841.   
Likewise, many view the business case as better aligning with corporate officers DQG GLUHFWRUV¶
ILGXFLDU\ GXW\ ³WRPD[LPL]H ILUP YDOXH DQG SUHVXPDEO\ WR HQKDQFH VKDUHKROGHU UHWXUQV´)DLUID[
supra note 40, at 858.  In their article Kang and Banaji contrast two conventional ways of viewing 
DIILUPDWLYH DFWLRQ D ³EDFNZDUG-looking frame RI FRUUHFWLYH MXVWLFH´ VXFK DVPRUDO UDWLRQDOHV IRU
UHGUHVVLQJKLVWRULFGLVFULPLQDWLRQDQGD³IRUZDUG-ORRNLQJIDPHRIXWLOLWDULDQHQJLQHHULQJ´VXFKDV
potential benefits of diversity). Kang & Banaji, supra note 25, at 1067±71, 1075 (arguing instead for a 
³SUHVHQWLVW´IUDPHRIDIILUPDWLYHDFWLRQWKDWUHVSRQGVWRLPSOLFLWELDV
44. See Foster, supra note 28, at 386. 
45. Id. 
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qualifications, a task usually assigned to the nominating committee.46  Despite 
this flexibility, most corporations use similar criteria.47  The traditional criteria 
to which most companies adhere are prior executive level and board 
experience.48  Thus, the fact that women also comprise a small number of top 
C-suite executives in public corporations tends to obstruct their ability to access 
directorships.49  It is clear expanding the criteria for directors is important in 
increasing the number of women.  In fact, exemplar companies with high 
gender diversity have integrated practices such as expanding criteria beyond 
the C-suite and prior board experience.50
However, merely expanding criteria is not enough.51  Aaron Dhir and 
Catalyst assert that the pool problem oversimplifies a complex issue.  They 
point to the large percentage of women in higher education and in other 
non-CEO senior management positions²including CFOs, chief legal officers, 
and other executive officers²who are in the pool, but not selected to serve.52
46. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.02 (AM. BAR ASS¶N, DPHQGHG  ³7KH DUWLFOHV RI
incorporation or bylaws may prescribe qualificatioQVIRUGLUHFWRUV´/LVD0)DLUID[Clogs in the 
Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and Continued Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD.
L. REV. 579, 599 (2006) [hereinafter Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline]. 
47. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline, supra note 46, at 599. 
48. Id.
49. Id. at 600. 
50. &HOLD+XEHU	6DUD2¶5RXUNHHow to Accelerate Gender Diversity on Boards, MCKINSEY 
& CO. (Jan. 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/leadership/how-to-accelerate-
gender-diversity-on-boards [https://perma.cc/JQ9L-TT2Y] (discussing how looking for candidates in 
fields such as law, academia, and the social sector can bring different perspectives and experiences to 
the board); see also David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Pioneering Women on Boards: Pathways of the 
First Female Directors, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES (Sept. 3, 2013), 
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-35-women-boards.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D4FD-BAYA] (observing that 41% of the first female directors had significant 
business experience, 17% had legal or consulting experience, and 14% had academic or research 
experience).  In the case of lawyers serving as directors of their corporate clients, there are both 
advantages and disadvantages, but RQHDGYDQWDJHPD\EHKHOSLQJZRPHQ³µFUDFNWKHJODVVFHLOLQJ¶´
Felix J. Bronstein, Note, The Lawyer as Director of the Corporate Client in the Wake of Sarbanes-
Oxley, 23 J.L. & COM. 53, 54±55 (2003) (quoting John F. X. Peloso & Irwin H. Warren, The Lawyer-
Director: Implications for Independence, 1998 ABA SECTION ON LITIGATION REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE OF THE INDEPENDENT LAWYER 3).  
51. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline, supra note 46, at 606.  Jennifer Brown also discusses the 
OLPLWDWLRQVRI³EODPLQJWKHSLSHOLQH´LQDGGUHVVLQJGLYHUVLW\LVVXHVLQWKHZRUNSODFHDQG how it can 
lead to inaction by corporate leadership. JENNIFER BROWN, INCLUSION: DIVERSITY, THE NEW 
WORKPLACE & THE WILL TO CHANGE   ³:KHQ DOO URDGV OHDG EDFN WR EODPLQJ WKH
pipeline . . . most managers consider the case closed, saying with a shruJWKDWLW¶VRXWVLGHWKHLUVSDQRI
LQIOXHQFH´
52. DHIR, supra note 34, at 38±42; The Supply Problem Myth: Fortune 500 Boards, CATALYST
(Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/supply-problem-myth-fortune-500-boards 
[https://perma.cc/LT5B-5YG7@'HVSLWHWKHVWDWLVWLFVLOOXVWUDWLQJZRPHQ¶VUDSLGHGXFDWLRQDOVXFFHVV
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Indeed, other factors beyond the pool problem tend to deny women the 
opportunity to reach the boardroom.  
Two critical factors are inadequate mentorship and stereotypes.53  In 
addition to lacking the traditional required experience,54 women also lack the 
same mentoring relationships and networking opportunities.55  Inadequate 
mentorship and sponsorship hurt female candidates on an individual level.  
According to research by McKinsey, women attribute challenges in advancing 
up the corporate ladder to factors such as lack of access to informal networks 
and lack of female role models and sponsors to provide opportunities.56  On a 
broader level, the dearth of mentorship and sponsorship can also deprive 
women of advocates who will support efforts to recruit and advance women as 
part of board agendas.57   
Importantly, women also face stereotypes and bias, which lead to 
perceptions that they lack the qualities of effective leaders.58  Evidence shows 
DQGWKHSHUSHWXDWLRQRIWKH³VPDUWJLUO´VWHUHRW\SHLQWKHODVWILIW\\HDUVZRPHQPXVWVWLOOQDYLJDWHWKH
political, social, and economic contexts in which sexism persists:  
Rather than being a cause for celebration, these highly publicized findings 
instiJDWHG SDQLF  &RQGHPQHG DV WKH ³IHPLQL]DWLRQ´ RI VFKRROLQJ IHPLQLVW
interventions were blamed for the perceived failure of boys. . . .  [W]omen now 
HDUQSHUFHQWRIPDVWHU¶VGHJUHHVFORVHWRKDOIRIODZDQGPHGLFLQHGHJUHHV
and 42 percent of MBAs.  Women now also earn close to 60 percent of all 
EDFKHORU¶V GHJUHHVPHDQLQJ WKDW IRU WKH ILUVW WLPH LQ KLVWRU\ZRPHQ UHFHLYH
more education than men. 
SHAUNA POMERANTZ & REBECCA RABY, SMART GIRLS: SUCCESS, SCHOOL, AND THE MYTH OF 
POST-FEMINISM 9±16 (2017). 
53. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline, supra note 46, at 601±02. 
54. See, e.g., Seletha R. Butler, “Financial Expert”: A Subtle Blow to the Pool and Current 
Pipeline of Women on Corporate Boards, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 20 (2013) (arguing that the 
requirement in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that issuers disclose whether their audit committee has 
at least one person who is a financial expert negatively impacts the ability of women to become board 
members). 
55. See SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD 65±67 (2013) 
(discuVVLQJ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI PHQWRULQJ DQG VSRQVRULQJ UHODWLRQVKLSV IRU ZRPHQ¶V DGYDQFHPHQW
opportunities); Diana Bilimoria & Sandy Kristin Piderit, Board Committee Membership: Effects of 
Sex-Based Bias, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1453, 1454, 1456 (1994).  




57. Bilimoria & Piderit, supra note 55, at 1456. 
58. CATALYST, WOMEN ³7AKE CARE´ MEN ³7AKE CHARGE´ STEREOTYPING OF U.S.
BUSINESS LEADERS EXPOSED 6 (2005), 
http://www.catalyst.org/system/files/Women_Take_Care_Men_Take_Charge_Stereotyping_of_U.S.
_Business_Leaders_Exposed.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FES-YKEU][hereinafter WOMEN ³7AKE 
CARE´]. 
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that gender bias impedes ZRPHQ¶Vadvancement opportunities and plays a role 
in gender disparities within corporate executive leadership.59  For example, one 
survey of corporate leaders found that based on stereotypes²WKDWPHQ³WDNH
FKDUJH´DQGZRPHQ³WDNHFDUH´²senior managers tend to believe inaccurately 
that women are relatively poor problem solvers.60 This fuels negative 
SHUFHSWLRQVRIZRPHQ¶VOHDGHUVKLSFRPSHWHQFH61
While the pool problem relates to challenges of women getting onto boards, 
tokenism refers to challenges and stereotypes women directors face after 
earning their seats.62  The perspectives of women directors who are viewed as 
WRNHQVPD\QRWEHKHDUGEHFDXVHRIDODFNRID³FULWLFDOPDVV´RIZRPHQRQWKH
board.63  This is especially true if a woman is the single diverse director or one 
of relatively few.  Thus, many commentators advocate for a critical mass of 
women directors to avoid tokenism.64  Otherwise, qualified token women 
³EHFRPHVXEMHFWWRH[FHVVLYHVFUXWLQ\´DQGQHJDWLYHVWHUHRW\SHV65
To fully address both tokenism and the pool problem, we must recognize 
how conscious and unconscious biases marginalize women in the first place.  
III. IMPLICIT BIAS AND BOARD DIVERSITY
Shifting to a focus on removing inherently biased structures requires an 
understanding of implicit intergroup bias.  This section explores the concept of 
implicit bias and its effect on board diversity.  Section III.A defines implicit 
intergroup bias and how it can lead to negative outcomes. Then, Section III.B 
59. ANIKA K. WARREN, CATALYST, CASCADING GENDER BIASES, COMPOUNDING EFFECTS:
AN ASSESSMENT OF TALENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 3 (2009), 
http://www.catalyst.org/system/files/Cascading_Gender_Biases_Compounding_Effects_An_Assess
ment_of_Talent_Management_Systems.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NM9-DM68]. 
60. WOMEN ³7AKE CARE´ supra note 58, at 10±12, 18.  Furthermore, in the same survey of 
corporate leaders, the male respondents believed that male leaders were also better than women at 
GHOHJDWLQJDQGLQIOXHQFLQJXSZDUGZKLFKZHUHFODVVLILHGDV³WDNLQJFKDUJH´EHKDYLRUVId. at 11.  On 
the other hand, the men believed that women were better at supporting and rewarding, which are 
FRQVLGHUHG³WDNLQJFDUH´EHKDYLRUVId. at 12.  
61. Id. at 7.  At the same time, when a woman is considered competent and successful at her job, 
VKHIDFHVEDFNODVKIURPRWKHUVLQFOXGLQJEHLQJODEHOHGDV³WRRDJJUHVVLYH´RU³GLIILFXOW´SANDBERG,
supra note 55, at 41; see also discussion infra note 146. 
62. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 17, at 408±09. 
63. Id.; Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Corporate Boardroom: Still a Male Club, 33 IOWA J. CORP.
L. 665, 679 (2008) (reviewing DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM  ³:LWK WKUHH RU PRUH
women on a board, every comment by a woman director ceases to be marginalized or scrutinized as 
WKHZRPDQ¶VYLHZDQGLVLQVWHDGYDOXHGIor its own meriW´
64. Broome, supra note 63, at 679.  
65. Bilimoria & Piderit, supra note 55, at 1457.  
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explains psychological interventions that may reduce implicit bias. Section 
III.C examines implicit bias in the nomination process and in the treatment of 
women directors.  Section III.C concludes by exploring current diversity 
training practices and areas for improvement. 
A. We All Have “Mindbugs”
The psychology of implicit social cognition provides insight into the role 
of implicit bias on boards.  Implicit social cognition describes the unconscious 
thoughts and feelings regarding social psychological constructs, such as 
attitudes and stereotypes.66  In other words, implicit social cognition describes 
the unconscious processes underneath judgments and behavior.67   
1.  Implicit Bias and Tools to Measure It  
One important form of implicit social cognition is implicit intergroup bias.  
In contrast to explicit bias, which is consciously detectable, implicit intergroup 
ELDV LVQRWGLUHFWO\ LQIHUDEOH³WKURXJK LQWURVSHFWLYHDZDUHQHVV´68  The main 
types of implicit intergroup bias are (1) implicit stereotyping, (2) implicit 
evaluative bias, which involves favorable or unfavorable attitudes, and (3) 
implicit affective bias, which refers to automatic feelings or emotional 
responses.69
In explaining implicit bias, Banaji and Greenwald use the term 
³PLQGEXJ,´70 a cognitive aQG VRFLDO HUURU LQ ZKLFK ³LQJUDLQHG KDELWV RI
thought . . . lead to errors in how we perceive, remember, reason, and make 
GHFLVLRQV´71  Others describe implicit bias as D³GLVFULPLQDWRU\ELDV>@EDVHGRQ
LPSOLFLWDWWLWXGHVRULPSOLFLWVWHUHRW\SHV´72  Similar to implicit bias is in-group 
66. Brian A. Nosek et al., Implicit Social Cognition, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
COGNITION 31, 32 (Susan T. Fiske & C. Neil Macrae eds., 2012). 
67. B. Keith Payne & Bertram Gawronski, A History of Implicit Social Cognition: Where Is It 
Coming From? Where Is It Now? Where Is It Going?, in HANDBOOK OF IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION:
MEASUREMENT, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS 1, 1 (Bertram Gawronski & B. Keith Payne eds., 2010).  
68. David M. Amodio & Saaid A. Mendoza, Implicit Intergroup Bias: Cognitive, Affective, and 
Motivational Underpinnings, in HANDBOOK OF IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION: MEASUREMENT,
THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 67, at 353, 355.   
69. Id. at 356±60; see also John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Intergroup Bias, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1084, 1084 (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010). 
70. MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD 
PEOPLE 4 (2013). 
71. Id.
72. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006) [hereinafter Scientific Foundations]. 
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bias or favoritism.  In-JURXSELDVUHIHUVWRIDYRULWLVPWRZDUGRQH¶VRZQJURXS73
Accordingly, implicit bias can be either favorable or unfavorable, and it is often 
expressed through in-group favoritism.74   
With regard to measuring implicit bias, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
is a widely used tool developed to detect implicit bias.75 7KH,$7OLQNV³DQ
attitude object . . . with an evaluative dimension . . . and test[s] how response 
DFFXUDF\ DQG VSHHG LQGLFDWH´ LPSOLFLW Eias.76 For example, the gender-
leadership IAT measures whether the test taker will more quickly associate 
male or female names with managerial characteristics such as leader, ambitious, 
and determined.77 7KH,$7¶VDVVRFLDWLRQWDVNVDUHEDVHGRQWKHIDFWWKDt we are 
unable to ignore automatic responses from our brains which have accumulated 
after years of prior experiences.78
73. Id.
74. Id. at 951±52; AM. ASS¶N OF UNIV. WOMEN, BARRIERS AND BIAS: THE STATUS OF WOMEN 
IN LEADERSHIP 24 (2016), https://www.aauw.org/research/barriers-and-bias/ 
[https://perma.cc/M3WN-6TGR] [hereinafter BARRIERS AND BIAS@³>,@PSOLFLWELDVRIWHQH[SUHVVHV
itself through in-group favoritLVPZKLFKFDQEHKDUGWRGHWHFW´
75. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 971 
(2006).  Not only does the IAT detect implicit bias, but IAT scores may also predict behavior.  Research 
has linked evaluative stereotype IAT scores (specifically, associating negative attributes with out-
group members) to harmful behavior such as economic discrimination. Laurie A. Rudman & Richard 
D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit Association Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP 
REL. 359, 359±72 (2007).  For example, one study found a correlation between associating negative 
attributes with minorities such as Blacks, Asians, and Jews and recommending budget cuts for the 
PLQRULW\JURXS¶VVWXGHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQ. Id. at 367±68.  At the same time, there is also some uncertainty 
UHJDUGLQJWKH,$7¶VDELOLW\WRSUHGLFWEHKDYLRU%DQDMLDQG*UHHQZDOGVXPPDUL]HVWXGLHVRQWKH,$7¶V
SUHGLFWLYHYDOLGLW\E\VWDWLQJ³,$7VFRUes correlated moderately with discriminatory judgments and 
EHKDYLRU´BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 70, at 50. 
76. Justin D. Levinson, Corporations Law: Biased Corporate Decision-Making?, in IMPLICIT 
RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 146, 149 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012). 
77. Kevin Miller, Are You Biased Against Women Leaders?, AM. ASS¶N UNIV. WOMEN (Feb. 
10, 2016), https://www.aauw.org/article/implicit-association-test/ [https://perma.cc/9YPU-AHUV].  
Results of the gender-leadership IAT indicate that people tend to associate men, rather than women, 
with leadership. Catherine Hill, Get the Facts: Implicit Bias and the AAUW Implicit Association Test 
on Gender and Leadership, AM. ASS¶N OF UNIV. WOMEN, https://www.aauw.org/resource/iat/ 
[https://perma.cc/UT2F-G3WN] (last visited Aug. 11, 2018).  Another variation of the IAT involving 
gender results in people associating men with careers and women with homemaking and family. See 
Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html [https://perma.cc/ZM2Z-NXZS] 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2018).  
78. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 70, at 39. 
40986 m
qt_102-2 Sheet No. 127 Side A      01/29/2019   13:38:24
40986 mqt_102-2 Sheet No. 127 Side A      01/29/2019   13:38:24
C M
Y K
THOMAS - MULR VOL. 102, NO. 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2019 12:21 PM 
2018] BIAS IN THE BOARDROOM 553 
2.  Implicit Bias is Pervasive and Can Affect Outcomes 
Everyone is subject to implicit biases.79  Although we are likely to perceive 
bias in others, we tend to lack the ability to recognize how it governs our own 
judgments and perceptions.80  Our inability to recognize our own implicit bias 
helps explain why conscious efforts to address it can be controversial.81  Indeed, 
implicit bias can HYHQOHDGWREHKDYLRUWKDWLVLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKDSHUVRQ¶VRZQ
beliefs.82
Implicit bias is not confined just to thought processes, but also may produce 
discriminatory behavior.  People evaluate others based on stereotypes they 
associate with the group to which others belong, which may result in automatic 
or spontaneous discriminatory actions.83  Furthermore, in terms of evaluation, 
³>Z@KHQ SHRSOH DFW LQZD\V WKDW YLRODWH RXU SUHFRQFHLYHG H[SHFWDWLRQV´ZH
assess them with more scrutiny than we otherwise would.84  For example, 
women executives may face unfair evaluation compared to their male 
counterparts.  Even where women and men executives perform based on the 
VDPHREMHFWLYH FULWHULD ³ERWKPHQ DQGZRPHQ MXGJHZRPHQ¶V performance 
ORZHUWKDQPHQ¶V´85
79. Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 369 (2002).  
80. Id.; see also BROWN, supra note 51, at 119±20 (citing Moving Mind-Sets on Gender 
Diversity: McKinsey Global Survey Results, MCKINSEY & CO. (Jan. 2014), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/moving-mind-sets-on-
gender-diversity-mckinsey-global-survey-results [https://perma.cc/C7SE-'%@³Just 19 percent of 
male respondents strongly agree that reaching top PDQDJHPHQWLVKDUGHUIRUZRPHQ´).
81. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 70, at 144.   
82. Scientific Foundations, supra note 72, at 951. 
83. See id. at 961.  Often this process of evaluating an individual based on stereotypes occurs 
quickly and without our awareness: 
When we are missing a piece of information, when we are acting quickly, talking 
IDVWRUPD\EHWRRPXFKRUKLULQJTXLFNO\WRPDWFKRXUFRPSDQ\¶VJURZWKZH
make an assumption that is more informed by our own background and 
experience and our own comfort level than it is on the facts . . . .  >:@H¶OO
naturally gravitate to FHUWDLQUHVXPHVRYHURWKHUVZH¶OOWKLQNWRSURPRWHFHUWDLQ
IRONVRYHURWKHUVDQGZH¶OOEXLOGWHDPVWKDWORRNOLNHXV
BROWN, supra note 51, at 11.
84. SANDBERG, supra note 55, at 40 (citing B. Ann Bettencourt et al., Evaluations of Ingroup 
and Outgroup Members: The Role of Category-Based Expectancy Violation, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 244 (1997)). 
85. 0DUOHHQ$2¶&RQQRUWomen Executives in Gladiator Corporate Cultures: The Behavioral 
Dynamics of Gender, Ego, and Power, 65 MD. L. REV. 465, 484 (2006).   
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B.  Interventions May Reduce Implicit Bias 
Psychologists have explored methods to moderate bias for years.  Much 
research focuses on facilitating personal connections and intergroup interaction 
to reduce bias generally.  For instance, psychologists recognize an effective 
strategy called the social contact hypothesis.86  The theory explains that 
interaction of people from different groups under certain conditions will 
weaken stereotypes and prejudice.87  Despite its rigid conditions, including 
interaction with others of equal status and non-superficial contact, it 
demonstrates the potential to reduce bias.88   
Research has also begun to suggest that implicit bias may be reduced 
through various interventions.89  Although motivations such as image 
preservation and social demands often intensify implicit bias, evidence shows 
certain strategies can moderate automatic stereotypes.90
1.  Interventions  
One key feature of effective interventions to reduce implicit intergroup bias 
is their long-term duration.91  For example, one study found that long-term 
diversity training and education can reduce implicit bias.92  Another study 
examined long-term exposure to female role models through seeing images of 
female exemplars and through real-life interaction with female math and 
science professors.93  In that study, women were less likely to hold stereotypical 
86. Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 69, at 1094.  
87. Kang & Banaji, supra note 25, at 1101. 
88. Id.  ,QWURGXFHG LQ WKH V WKH VRFLDO FRQWDFW K\SRWKHVLV UHTXLUHV WKDW SHRSOH³ >EH@
exposed to disconfirming data; (2) interact with others of equal status; (3) cooperate; (4) engage in 
non-VXSHUILFLDOFRQWDFWDQGUHFHLYHFOHDUQRUPVLQIDYRURIHTXDOLW\´Id.
89. See Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 244 (2002) (finding that certain moderators including self and social 
motives and specific strategies to counter stereotypes can impact automatic stereotypes); Calvin K. Lai 
et al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences: I. A Comparative Investigation of 17 Interventions, 143 
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 1765 (2014) (comparing 17 interventions for reducing the 
expression of implicit racial prejudice); Laurie A. Rudman et al., “Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The 
Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 856 (2001) 
(finding that diversity education may reduce automatic intergroup bias). 
90. Blair, supra note 89, at 244, 247±49. 
91. See Nosek et al., supra note 66, at 46.  
92. Rudman et al., supra note 89, at 865 GHVFULELQJWKHSRVLWLYHHIIHFWRIXQLYHUVLW\VWXGHQWV¶
participation in a seminar on prejudice and conflict). 
93. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing is Believing: Exposure to Counterstereotypic 
Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotyping, 40 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642, 654±55 (2004).  
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beliefs about themselves after exposure to counter-stereotypic exemplars over 
a period of one year.94
In addition, some studies showing a reduction in implicit bias feature 
certain intervention strategies.  These strategies include (1) stereotype 
replacement, (2) counter-stereotypic imaging, (3) individuation, (4) 
perspective-taking, and (5) increasing contact with out-group members.95
Stereotype replacement refers to recognizing a response is based on stereotypes 
and replacing a biased response with accurate information.96  In counter-
stereotypic imaging, one visualizes a counter-stereotypical person to increase 
the accessibility of a positive exemplar.97  Individuation involves viewing 
others according to personal characteristics.98  Perspective-taking refers to 
personally taking the perspective of a member of a stigmatized group.99  Finally, 
increasing contact with out-JURXS PHPEHUV DOORZV LQGLYLGXDOV WR ³VHHN>@
opportunities to encounter and engage in positive interactions with out-group 
PHPEHUV´100   
Incorporating these specific strategies in a gender bias habit-changing 
workshop, a study of gender bias among university STEM faculty members 
found improved department climate in support of the advancement of 
women.101  Two years following the study, in those university departments that 
received the training, the percentage of women faculty hired increased by an 
94. Id. at 654±55.  The part of the study that exposed women to images of famous counter-
stereotypic female leaders focused on positive role models in law, science, and politics, including 
Madeleine Albright, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Oprah Winfrey. Id. at 655.  
95. Molly Carnes et al., The Effect of an Intervention to Break the Gender Bias Habit for Faculty 
at One Institution: A Cluster Randomized, Controlled Trial, 90 ACAD. MED. 221, 223 (2015); Patricia 
G. Devine et al., Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race Bias: A Prejudice Habit-Breaking Intervention,
48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1267, 1270±72 (2012).  Research comparing a variety of 
intervention strategies found that strategies using counter-stereotypic exemplars were among the most 
effective. Lai et al., supra note 89.   
96. Devine et al., supra note 95, at 1270.  
97. Id. at 1270±71; see also Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability 
of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice With Images of Admired and Disliked 
Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803±04, 807 (2001) (finding that exposure to 
admired Black exemplars and disliked White exemplars decreased automatic pro-White attitudes 24 
hours after exposure).   
98. Devine et al., supra note 95, at 1271.  
99. Id.; see also Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing 
Stereotype Expression, Stereotype Accessibility, and In-Group Favoritism, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 708, 721 (2000).  
100. Devine et al., supra note 95, at 1271. 
101. Carnes et al., supra note 95, at 228.   
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estimated 18%.102  Significantly, these strategies can mutually reinforce one 
another.103  The strategies can also increase the concern individuals feel about 
GLVFULPLQDWLRQ ZKLFK KHOSV ³WUDQVODWH . . . knowledge of bias-reducing 
strDWHJLHVLQWRDFWLRQ´104
2.  Implications and Working Around Bias 
Excluding a relatively modest amount of research showing evidence of 
change, most studies have only established ways to temporarily reduce the 
effect of implicit bias.105  There is currently a lack of firmly established methods 
for completely eliminating implicit bias.106  But this is not a reason to give up, 
as scholars expect further research to expand their understanding of implicit 
bias.107 0RUHRYHU FRUSRUDWLRQV WKDW ³PDNH D VRSKLVWLFDWHG FRPPLWPHQW WR
reduce corporate implicit bias through . . . WUDLQLQJSURJUDPV´and other efforts 
can still make progress.108
Given the lack of evidence showing implicit bias can be completely 
eradicated, Banaji and Greenwald note there are effective ways to work around
it.109 2QHLVLPSOHPHQWLQJ³JXLGHOLQHVWRHOLPLQDWHGLVFUHWLRQIURPMXGJPHQWV
that might otherwisH DIIRUG RSSRUWXQLW\ IRU >LPSOLFLW ELDV@´110  Similarly, 
because evidence shows that quick, reflexive judgments exacerbate implicit 
bias, rational deliberation may overcome it when one evaluates out-group 
members.111
102. Patricia G. Devine et al., A Gender Bias Habit-Breaking Intervention Led to Increased 
Hiring of Female Faculty in STEM Departments, 73 J. EXPERIMENTAL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 211, 211
(2017).  The study, which involved STEM faculty at the University of Wisconsin, illustrates the 
potential of implicit bias trainings to shape behavior. Jessica Nordell, Does Starbucks Understand the 
Science of Racial Bias?, THE ATLANTIC (May 2, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/05/starbucks-unconscious-bias-training/559415/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q6VX-6HB4]. 
103. Devine et al., supra note 95, at 1270.  
104. Id. at 1276.  
105. Levinson, supra note 76, at 161±62; Nosek et al., supra note 66, at 45±46. 
106. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 70, at 149. 
107. See id. at 152±53. 
108. Levinson, supra note 76, at 162. 
109. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 70, at 153. 
110. Id. at 166±67.   
111. Daniel A. Yudkin et al., Reflexive Intergroup Bias in Third-Party Punishment, 145 J.
EXPERIMENTAL. PSYCHOL.: GEN. 1448, 1449 (2016).  In a social experiment testing whether people 
had a tendency to punish out-group members, two psychologists made the following observations on 
how implicit bias may be reduced with rational deliberation: 
When people made their decisions swiftly²in a few seconds or less²they were 
biased in their . . . decisions.  Not only did they punish out-group members more 
harshly, they also treated members of their own group more leniently. . . .  But 
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Another method to work around implicit bias is objective assessments.  An 
influential study examining the Boston Symphony Orchestra demonstrates one 
type of objective assessment.112  The study found that after the orchestra 
implemented a curtain as part of a blind audition procedure, female musicianV¶
chances of advancing in the hiring process increased dramatically.113  While the 
blind audition device may not be directly translatable to the selection of board 
nominees, the concept of objective assessments is useful and may be applied to 
evaluating potential candidates.   
Assuming implicit bias exists and can be reduced, some may still question 
its appropriateness.  First, critics may argue the focus should be on explicit 
discrimination, which is still a serious problem.  Although this critique sees 
implicit bias as causing people to overlook conscious bias, it is possible to focus 
on both concurrently, and efforts to overcome implicit bias may help address 
many types of discrimination, including explicit discrimination, implicit bias, 
and institutional discrimination.114  In addition, a critic may point out 
conceptual difficulties.  Implicit bias challenges legal theory, which assumes 
we also found that people could overcome these biased instincts if they engaged 
in rational deliberation.  When people had the chance to reflect on their decision, 
they were largely unbiased, handing out equal punishments to in-group and out-
group members.   
Daniel A. Yudkin & Jay Van Bavel, The Roots of Implicit Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/opinion/sunday/the-roots-of-implicit-bias.html 
[https://perma.cc/7ZHQ-A4U8]. 
112. Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” 
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 715 (2000). 
113. Id. at 716.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained her take on the famous U.S. symphony orchestra 
study as follows:  
When I was growing up, one never saw a woman in the symphony 
orchestra . . . .  6RPHRQHKDGWKHVLPSOHLGHD³/HW¶VGURSDFXUWDLQ/HW¶VGURSD
curtain between the people who are auditioning and the people who are 
MXGJLQJ´ . . .  2QFHWKHFXUWDLQZDVGURSSHGWKHWHVWHUVFRXOGQ¶WWHOOZKHther it 
was a man²or a woman.  And they made their judgments based on the quality 
of the performance. 
Irin Carmon, Exclusive Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Interview: Full Transcript, MSNBC (Feb. 17, 
2015, 8:06 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/exclusive-justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-interview-full-
transcript [https://perma.cc/U8JA-Q3BY] (discussing the challenge of addressing unconscious bias as 
DQH[DPSOHRI³XQILQLVKHGEXVLQHVV´LQJHQGHUHTXDOLW\ and noting that the blind audition curtain is 
³QRWVRHDV\WRGXSOLFDWHLQRWKHUDUHDV´). 
114. Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: 
Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1058±59 (2009); see Olivia Goldhill, The
World is Relying on a Flawed Psychological Test to Fight Racism, QUARTZ (Dec. 3, 2017), 
https://qz.com/1144504/the-world-is-relying-on-a-flawed-psychological-test-to-fight-racism/ 
[https://perma.cc/FU6M-PWCV] (quoting Anthony Greenwald who exSODLQHG ³7KH UHPHGLHV ,
aGYRFDWHDUHHTXDOO\VXLWDEOHIRU$//IRUPVRIXQLQWHQGHGGLVFULPLQDWLRQ´
40986 m
qt_102-2 Sheet No. 129 Side B      01/29/2019   13:38:24
40986 mqt_102-2 Sheet No. 129 Side B      01/29/2019   13:38:24
C M
Y K
THOMAS - MULR VOL. 102, NO. 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2019 12:21 PM 
558 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:539 
GLVFULPLQDWLRQE\KXPDQDFWRUVLV³JXLGHGE\WKHLUDYRZHGH[SOLFLWEHOLHIV
DWWLWXGHV DQG LQWHQWLRQV´115  However, even if recognizing implicit bias 
requires a shift in how the law views discrimination, we should not ignore its 
pervasive impact.    
C.  Implicit Bias in the Selection and Treatment of Women Directors 
We should expect that the same implicit biases held by individuals 
generally are also present in directors and on nominating committees.  The 
presence of implicit bias on the board of directors has consequences for 
representation of women on boards.  Practically, it manifests in the selection of 
nominees and in the treatment of women directors.   
1.  Selection of Nominees 
Implicit bias can infect the process in which board nominees are chosen.  
Many have suggested there is gender bias in the director appointment process 
and that recruiting favors men.116  In a 2015 Government Accountability Office 
report, almost half of stakeholders surveyed listed unconscious bias as a factor 
affecting the selection of women on boards.117  To provide context, common 
sources of director nominations include the CEO, members of the board, 
executive search firms, and major shareholders.118  When members of the board 
115. Scientific Foundations, supra note 72, at 951. 
116. See Juan Manuel García Lara et al., The Monitoring Role of Female Directors Over 
Accounting Quality, 45 J. CORP. FIN. 651, 654 (2017) (noting gender bias in the processes of appointing 
directors and recruiting).  This pattern mirrors the broader workplace hiring process, in which female 
job candidates may be evaluated as less competent than identical males. RACHEL D. GODSIL ET AL., 2
THE SCIENCE OF EQUALITY: THE EFFECTS OF GENDER ROLES, IMPLICIT BIAS, AND STEREOTYPE 
THREAT ON THE LIVES OF WOMEN AND GIRLS 36 (2016) (citing Corinne A. Moss-Racusin et al., 
Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students, 109 PROC. NAT¶L ACAD. SCI. 16474, 
16477) (2012)). 
117. U.S. GOV¶T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-30, CORPORATE BOARDS: STRATEGIES TO 
ADDRESS REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN INCLUDE FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 13 (2015) 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
118. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INSIGHTS FROM THE BOARDROOM 2012: BOARD 




[https://perma.cc/A2ER-74ZU] [hereinafter INSIGHTS FROM THE BOARDROOM].  Following Sarbanes-
Oxley, 96% of public corporations have a formal nominating committee. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline,
supra note 46, at 599 n.109 (citing KORN/FERRY INT¶L, 31ST ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY
12 tbl.B (2004)).  The nominating and governance committees of public corporations control board 
succession, set director selection criteria, and choose the director candidates that are ultimately 
submitted to shareholders for a vote. EY Ctr. for Bd. Matters, A Look Inside Nominating and 
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make recommendations for nominees, most rely on the opinions of other board 
members, with 90% of directors surveyed reporting that they look to the 
recommendations of other directors to recruit new members.119  In addition, 
67% of directors use search firms to identify candidates and 54% rely on 
management recommendations.120  Since the sources of most nominee 
recommendations are CEOs and other directors, implicit bias in selecting 
nominees appears to manifest as in-group favoritism.121
Because boards want new members to fit in, directors have a tendency to 
VHOHFW QRPLQHHV WKDW ³ORRN DQG VRXQG OLNH WKH\ GR´122  Donald Langevoort 
GHVFULEHV KRZ ERDUGV QDWXUDOO\ PRYH ³DZD\ IURP GLYHUVLW\ DQG toward 
FROOHJLDOLW\´ ZKHQ FKRRVLQJ QRPLQHHV123  Similarly, when CEOs make 
recRPPHQGDWLRQVWKH\PD\³VHOHFWWKHLUFXOWXUDODQGGHPRJUDSKLFFORQHV´124
As such, the combination of unconscious bias and closed social networks means 
board nominating committees ³DUHOLNHO\WRUHFUXLWQHZPHPEHUVIURPH[LVWLQJ
SHUVRQDOQHWZRUNV´ZKLFKPD\ be demographically homogenous.125  Moreover, 
when the nominating committee lacks objective criteria for selecting board 
Governance Committees, ERNST & YOUNG (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-center-for-board-matters-a-look-inside-
nominating-and-governance-committees/$FILE/EY-center-for-board-matters-a-look-inside-
nominating-and-governance-committees.pdf [https://perma.cc/VVH5-LN93].  In addition, 51% of 
nominating and governance committees oversee director orientation and continuing education for 
directors, and therefore could play a role in providing unconscious bias training for directors. See id.;
infra Section IV.A. 
119. INSIGHTS FROM THE BOARDROOM, supra note 118 at 6±7 (commenting that the high 
percentage of recruitment recommendations coming from other directors suggests that directors prefer 
³LQGLYLGXDOVUHFRPPHQGHGE\VRPHRQHWKH\NQRZDQGWUXVW´
120. Id. at 6±7. 
121. See Aaron A. Dhir, Towards a Race- and Gender-Conscious Conception of the Firm: 
Canadian Corporate Governance, Law and Diversity, 35 QUEEN¶S L.J. 569, 580 (2010) (discussing 
WKH ³KXman tendency toward in-JURXS IDYRXULWLVP´ LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI SURPRWLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV WR
leadership positions).   
122. GAO REPORT, supra note 117, at 13; Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of 
Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and 
Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 811 (2001).  
123. Langevoort, supra note 122, at 811.  
124. Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity 
Lags in America’s Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1591±92 
 ³,W LV RQO\ natural that a CEO would prefer someone that is culturally proximate to 
himself . . . ´
125. DHIR, supra note 34, at 47, 53.  Indeed, in a Harvard Business Review study of the 
experiences of female directors, even 33% of male directors interviewed believed that women face 
OLPLWHGDFFHVV WRERDUGVEHFDXVHRIZHDNHUQHWZRUNVDQG WKH³ROGER\V¶FOXE´%RULV*UR\VEHUJ	
Deborah Bell, Dysfunction in the Boardroom, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2013, at 88, 95.  
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nominees, nominations tend to come from a small pool of individuals from 
personal networks.126
In addressing issues of bias in workplace hiring in general, companies 
increasingly utilize tools such as data analytics to address gender gaps and 
objective assessments to select new hires.127  For example, data analytics can 
incorporate algorithms that screen job candidates through personality tests 
based on skills and qualities companies seek.128  Companies can also use 
platforms that ask candidates objective questions relating to the job, from which 
the company evaluates ansZHUVZLWKRXW NQRZLQJ WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V LGHQWLW\129
Interestingly, sophisticated screening algorithms have been shown to increase 
gender diversity by taking human bias out of the equation.130
Similar tools can also apply to the board of directors, specifically in the 
selection of board nominees, to proactively ensure the process is not biased.  
However, the tools have potential pitfalls that companies must manage.  First, 
as Kang and Banaji explain, our conception of merit must take into account 
how implicit bias skews outcomes and how seemingly fair assessments can 
EHFRPH ³PLVPHDVXUHPHQWV´ EHFDXVH RI ELDV131  In addition, data analytics 
brings D ULVNRI DOJRULWKPELDVDQGGLVFULPLQDWLRQE\GHIDXOW WR³FDWHJRULFDO
judgments based on demographic charDFWHULVWLFV´132  Algorithms are designed 
126. Jeff Cunningham, Women in the Boardroom: A Guide for Journalists, MEDIUM (Oct. 18, 
2017), https://medium.com/@cunninghamjeff/women-in-the-boardroom-the-media-is-clueless-
2fc94c712fe7 [https://perma.cc/VD4W-SA9L]. 
127. IRIS BOHNET, WHAT WORKS: GENDER EQUALITY BY DESIGN 109, 139±44 (2016); see also
Ji-a Min, 5 Google People Analytics Lessons You Can Steal, IDEAL BLOG (Oct. 4, 2016) 
https://ideal.com/google-people-analytics/ [https://perma.cc/F8VB-AWE2].   
128. Bourree Lam, For More Workplace Diversity, Should Algorithms Make Hiring Decisions?,
THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 22, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/algorithm-
hiring-diversity-HR/396374/ [https://perma.cc/N864-LQB7]. 
129. See id.; Matt Reynolds, Hiring Tool Uses Behavioural Science to Stop Recruitment Bias,
NEWSCIENTIST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2122323-hiring-tool-uses-
behavioural-science-to-stop-recruitment-bias/ [https://perma.cc/KN6M-ELQZ]. 
130. See Henri de Romrée et al., People Analytics Reveals Three Things HR May Be Getting 
Wrong, MCKINSEY Q. (July 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-
insights/people-analytics-reveals-three-things-hr-may-be-getting-wrong [https://perma.cc/YQ6C-
*(*;@ GHVFULELQJ WKH VXFFHVVRIRQHFRPSDQ\¶s hiring algorithm in automatically yielding more 
women through the screening process based on merit, deEXQNLQJ LWV DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW ³VFUHHQLQJ
FRQGXFWHGE\KXPDQVZRXOGLQFUHDVHJHQGHUGLYHUVLW\PRUHHIIHFWLYHO\´
131. Kang & Banaji, supra note 25, at 1089±91.  As such, when utilizing tools that seek 
candidates based on merit, it is important to develop assessments carefully, including making sure that 
decision makers are aware of their own biases. Id. at 1090±92; see also discussion infra Section IV.A.   
132. BOHNET, supra note 127, at 118; see *LGHRQ0DQQ	&DWK\2¶1HLOHiring Algorithms Are 
Not Neutral, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 9, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/hiring-algorithms-are-not-
neutral [https://perma.cc/KYQ4-25Q6]. 
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to imitate human decision-making.133  As a result, they may inadvertently 
incorporate the biases of the humans who build them.134  Finally, objective 
assessments may lead to backlash and resistance from decision makers.  For 
instance, some managers resist pressure to hire people other than whom they 
want.135  Indeed, managers at one company used hiring tests selectively, 
overlooking results when men failed a math test, but taking note when women 
failed.136   
To further tackle the implicit bias that is embedded in the director selection 
process, Part IV of this Article emphasizes the need to work collectively to 
implement strategies to eliminate bias.  Moreover, because the current SEC 
disclosure law does not address whether board selection is impacted by bias,137
Part IV proposes modifications to the rule to lessen the invisibility of implicit 
bias. 
2.  Boardroom Challenges, Stereotypes, and Tokenism 
Apart from implicit bias in the nomination process, problems also continue 
once women join boards.  Anecdotal evidence indicates that bias affects 
boardroom dynamics and the treatment of women directors.  One study found 
that 87% of women directors reported facing challenges based on their gender, 
including not being heard, not being accepted as part RI WKH ³LQ´ JURXS
difficulty establishing credibility, and stereotypes.138
Not being accepted and not being heard are particularly challenging for 
women GLUHFWRUV  ,Q RQH FDVH D IRUPHU GLUHFWRU RQ 4XLNVLOYHU¶V ERDUG
explained that unconscious bias led fellow board members to exclude her from 
133. 0DQQ	2¶1HLOsupra note 132, at 2. 
134. Id.
135. Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Diversity Programs Fail, HARV. BUS. REV., July±
Aug. 2016, at 52, 55.   
136. Id.
137. See Cheryl L. Wade, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Racial Politics Impedes 
Progress in the United States, 26 PACE INT¶L L. REV. 23, 33 (2014) (discussing how a main problem 
ZLWKWKH6(&¶VERDUGGLYHUVLW\Gisclosure rule is the failure to define diversity, allowing companies to 
define it very broadly and ignore the presence of bias). 
138. Groysberg & Bell, supra note 125, at 94.  One female director noted her struggle by 
H[SODLQLQJ³,RIWHQIHHOWKDW,¶PQRWKHDUGDQGWKDW,QHHGWRSXWPRUHHIIRUW LQWRPDNLQJVXUHWKDW
RWKHUVKHDUDQGXQGHUVWDQGP\SRLQWRIYLHZ´Id.  Another female director described the feeling of not 
EHLQJDFFHSWHGDVIROORZV³,W¶VEHHQDFKDOOHQJHHDUQLQJUHVSHFWDQGEHLQJWUHDWHGDVDQHTXDOPHPEHU
SDUWLFXODUO\ZLWKWKHROGHUERDUGPHPEHUV´Id.  Data also illustrates that women directors are more 
likely to be excluded from networks through informal social gatherings such as gROIZKLFK³UHLQIRUFHV
WKHWUDGLWLRQRIWKHROGER\V¶FOXE´DQGOHDGVVRPHIHPDOHOHDGHUVWRIHHOWKHQHHGWRSOD\JROIMXVWWR
avoid being left out. Id. at 93.  
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important conversations and prompted her to resign.139  A disparaging comment 
by a director at Uber further shows biased dynamics at work.  The director 
mockingly remarked that adding more women to a board only means ³LW¶VPXFK
PRUH OLNHO\ >WKHUHZLOO@ EHPRUH WDONLQJ´140  These reports are in line with 
research indicating that women face challenges in making their voices heard 
and being accepted during high-level executive meetings.141
Furthermore, when women directors are viewed as tokens or face a lack of 
critical mass of women GLUHFWRUVRQWKHERDUG³WKHLUDWWULEXWHVDUHGLVWRUWHGVR
WKDW WKH\ EHFRPH WUDSSHG LQ VWHUHRW\SLFDO UROHV´142  According to many 
scholars, without a critical mass of three or more directors from the same group, 
WKH UHVW RI WKH ERDUGZLOOPDUJLQDOL]H DQG VFUXWLQL]H WKHPLQRULW\ GLUHFWRU¶V
views.143  In the context of tokenism and excessive scrutiny, women business 
leaders must grapple with the double bind, an important manifestation of gender 
bias and stereotypes.144  For instance, women are often stereotyped as being 
³NLQG´ ³QXUWXULQJ´ DQG ³KHOSIXO´²DOO ³OLNHDEOH´ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV EXW
characteristics that are perceived as inconsistent with competence.145  Yet 
women who are dominant and decisive tend to be perceived as competent but 
unlikeable.146
139. Liz Dolan, Gender Bias Forced Me to Quit Quiksilver’s Board, FORTUNE (June 15, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/06/15/liz-dolan-quiksilver-board/ [[https://perma.cc/HQA6-MAY6]. 
140. Mike Isaac & Susan Chira, David Bonderman Resigns From Uber Board After Sexist 
Remark, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/technology/uber-sexual-
harassment-huffington-bonderman.html [https://perma.cc/8KXZ-GR8F]. 
141. BONNIE FETCH & JESSICA POLINER, (UN) SKIRTING THE ISSUES: A GUIDE FOR THE WELL-
INTENTIONED MAN IN TODAY¶S WORKPLACE 108 (2017) (citing KATHRYN HEATH ET AL., SUCCESS 
ON THE CORPORATE STAGE: WHY MEETINGS MATTER EVEN MORE FOR WOMEN 2 (2014), 
https://www.flynnheath.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Why-Meetings-Matter-Even-More-for-
Women_FHH-Report_June-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/72BA-769<@ ³7KH ERWWRP OLQH PHQ DUH
rewarded for talking more, and womHQDUHQRW  ,QDGGLWLRQZRPHQ¶V LGHDVDUHDOVRPRUHKDUVKO\
scUXWLQL]HG´
142. Bilimoria & Piderit, supra note 55, at 1457.  
143. Broome, supra note 63, at 679. 
144. Damned or Doomed—Catalyst Study on Gender Stereotyping at Work Uncovers Double-
Bind Dilemmas for Women, CATALYST, https://www.catalyst.org/media/damned-or-doomed-catalyst-
study-gender-stereotyping-work-uncovers-double-bind-dilemmas-women [https://perma.cc/FG49-
JTPS] (last visited Aug. 15, 2018).  
145. FETCH & POLINER supra note 141, at 117. 
146. Id. DW³6XFFHVVDQG likeability are positively correlated for men, but they are negatively 
correlated for women.  Sometimes, but not always, women are viewed as competent when they are 
more out-spoken and aggressive; in essence, when they embody stereotypically masculine traLWV´
The double bind is a well-known challenge in which women face criticism for being assertive. Miller 
et al., supra note 3.  An experiment involving a Harvard Business School case study about a successful 
female venture capitalist named Heidi Roizen illustrates the double bind. SANDBERG, supra note 55, 
at 39±40 (citing discussions with Professor Frank J. Flynn and citing Kathleen McGinn & Nicole 
40986 m
qt_102-2 Sheet No. 132 Side A      01/29/2019   13:38:24
40986 mqt_102-2 Sheet No. 132 Side A      01/29/2019   13:38:24
C M
Y K
THOMAS - MULR VOL. 102, NO. 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2019 12:21 PM 
2018] BIAS IN THE BOARDROOM 563 
As discussed in Part IV, voluntary targets aiming to reach a critical mass 
can help address these boardroom challenges.  However, a critical mass of 
women directors is important not just because it may help maximL]HZRPHQ¶V
contributions to the board.  There are also important research-based indications 
that more women directors could promote increased intergroup contact and 
counter-stereotypic imaging, two strategies proven to reduce implicit bias.147
3.  Current Efforts to Address Implicit Bias 
U.S. corporations spend $8 billion per year on diversity training.148  Most 
corporations offer some form of training, including workshops with trained 
instructors, web seminars, and strategies for managers in hiring.149  Notably, 
many companies strive to address implicit bias in their trainings.  Google has 
implemented unconscious bias trainings, and over half of its employees have 
participated.150  In May 2018, Starbucks conducted unconscious bias training 
for employees as part of a comprehensive diversity and inclusion effort.151
Tempest, Heidi Roizen, Harvard Business School Case Study 9-800-228 (Jan. 2000 (revised 2010)), 
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=26880 [https://perma.cc/5WZZ-GCBR]); see also 
Joanne Martin, Gender-Related Material in the New Curriculum, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. BUS. (Jan. 
1, 2007), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/experience/news-history/gender-related-material-new-core-
curriculum [https://perma.cc/Q23N-9HY7]; Joyce Routson, Heidi Roizen: Networking Is More Than 
Collecting Lots of Names, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. BUS. (Nov. 1, 2009), 
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/heidi-roizen-networking-more-collecting-lots-names
[https://perma.cc/GZ5C-S4D5].  In a 2003 experiment conducted by Professor Frank Flynn and 
Professor Cameron Anderson, students submitted their impressions of the Heidi Roizen case study 
which was identical for every student, except that half of WKHVWXGHQWVUHYLHZHGDFDVHFDOOHG³+HLGL´
DQGWKHRWKHUKDOIUHFHLYHGDFDVHFDOOHG³+RZDUG´SANDBERG, supra note 55, at 39±40.  The students 
who evaluated Heidi disliked her and judged her more critically than they judged Howard. Id.
147. See supra Section III.B, pp. 554±55.  Another benefit of increased intergroup contact and 
counter-stereotypic imagining may be helping by addressing the gender-related obstacles that men too 
face. See FETCH & POLINER, supra QRWHDW³*HQGHUGLYHUVity has another, bigger impact that 
is less often recognized:  it helps men to step outside of traditional roles and follow their unique talents.  
This is important because men also still face challenges when they attempt to pursue roles outside of 
the norP´
148. BOHNET, supra note 127, at 51. 
149. Id.
150. Farhad Manjoo, Exposing Hidden Bias at Google, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/technology/exposing-hidden-biases-at-google-to-improve-
diversity.html [https://perma.cc/DVW3-NS2F].  
151. Yuki Noguchi, Starbucks Training Focuses on the Evolving Study of Unconscious Bias,
NAT¶L PUB. RADIO (May 17, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/17/611909506/starbucks-
training-focuses-on-the-evolving-study-of-unconscious-bias [https://perma.cc/52G3-LTJN]; Nordell, 
supra note 102; Starbucks Shares Further Details on Multi-Phase Anti-Bias Training Efforts,
STARBUCKS, https://news.starbucks.com/views/starbucks-shares-further-details-on-anti-bias-training-
efforts [https://perma.cc/9DLN-3UTJ] (last visited Aug. 16, 2018). 
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&RPSDQLHV WKDW DUH UDQNHG WKH ³EHVW´ LQ GLYHUVLW\ SURJUDPV DOVR FRPPRQO\
incorporate trainings on cultural sensitivity and recognizing unconscious 
bias.152
At the same time, many corporate diversity trainings are flawed.  Despite 
the extensive resources devoted to trainings, studies show that training has not 
led to increases in managerial diversity.153  Significant reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of such programs are mandatory attendance, negative 
messaging, manager resistance, and the need to focus more RQ ³KLULQJ DQG
promotion routines that can quash subjectivity and bias.´154  For example, 
mandatory trainings can activate bLDVEHFDXVHSHRSOH ³UHEHO DJDLQVW UXOHV WR
DVVHUWWKHLUDXWRQRP\´DQGWUDLQLQJVRIWHQ have a remedial, negative focus.155
As a result, managers particularly begin to feel shamed and resent the 
VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW WKH\ DUH ³RSSUHVVRUV´ UHVSRQVLEOH IRU FRPSDQ\ Giversity 
failures.156
It is also difficult to say how many companies provide diversity training to 
senior managers, much less to directors.  According to Dhir, efforts to expand 
diversity training to leaders at the corporate governance level have only recently 
emerged and their results are untested.157  Moreover, organizations often 
provide training program services for directors, including as part of a new 
director orientation program, but it is unclear if implicit bias training plays any 
role in such programs.158
Some prominent firms have begun to offer unconscious bias trainings to 
key decision makers, though it is less clear whether they involve members of 
152. Michael Bush & Kim Peters, How the Best Companies Do Diversity Right, FORTUNE (Dec. 
5, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/12/05/diversity-inclusion-workplaces [https://perma.cc/5T28-
HWDH].  
153. Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate 
Affirmative Action and Diversity Polices, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589, 595 (2006) [hereinafter Best 
Practices or Best Guesses?]; Frank Dobbin et al., Diversity Management in Corporate America,
CONTEXTS, Fall 2007, at 21, 21 [hereinafter Diversity Management].
154. Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 135, at 54±55; Diversity Management, supra note 153, at 26±
27. 
155. Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 135, at 54±55.  
156. Best Practices or Best Guesses?, supra note 153, at 595.   
157. DHIR, supra note 34, at 51.  
158. Joan Conley, Onboarding New Directors: Beyond the Board Manual, NASDAQ 
MARKETINSITE (July 5, 2017), http://business.nasdaq.com/marketinsite/2017/Onboarding-New-
Directors-Beyond-the-Board-Manual.html [https://perma.cc/3M5C-3R2N]; In-Boardroom Education 
Programs, NAT¶L ASS¶N CORP. DIRECTORS, https://www.nacdonline.org/services/content.cfm?itemn
umber=53239 [https://perma.cc/7534-Q3BG] (last visited Aug. 26, 2018) (offering customized 
training programs for directors and C-suite executives, with sample topics such as board and 
management dynamics, board skills and composition, fiduciary duties, and talent oversight).   
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2018] BIAS IN THE BOARDROOM 565 
the board of directors.159  For example, BMO Financial Group, which has 
received praise for its commitment to diversity and inclusion, provides training 
to managers.160  The company explains the trainings seek to help managers 
³UHFRJQL]HNH\EOLQGVSRWVZKHQWKH\DUHDVVHVVLQJZRPHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHDQG
potential, as well as tools that equip them to make fair and objective decisions 
UHODWHG WR WDOHQW´161  As a further example, when Facebook announced its 
unconscious bias training in 2015, over 90% of its senior leadership 
participated.162  More companies should not only encourage top officers but 
also directors to participate in trainings to reduce implicit bias.  Part IV of this 
Article suggests ways to improve corporate diversity practices to address 
implicit bias.  
IV. DEBIASING THE BOARDROOM: TRAINING, DISCLOSURE, AND 
COLLABORATION
To overcome bias in the nomination process and in the boardroom, a 
combination of improved training, modified disclosure, and collaborative 
voluntary action is necessary.  Section IV.A discusses how voluntary implicit 
bias trainings offered to directors and executives will help overcome bias.163
Section IV.B proposes modifying Regulation S-K to define diversity and to 
require disclosure of whether a company offers trainings to directors and 
officers.164  Finally, Section IV.C prescribes voluntary actions such as 
159. See, e.g., Mastercard Unconscious Bias, CEO ACTION FOR DIVERSITY & INCLUSION,
https://www.ceoaction.com/actions/unconscious-bias/ [https://perma.cc/6C39-UZU5] (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2018) (describing customized training offered to managers and all employees).  Many CEOs 
and presidents of leading companies have signed the CEO Action for Diversity & Inclusion pledge, 
ZKLFKDPRQJRWKHUWKLQJVLQYROYHVDSURPLVHWR³LPSOHPHQWDQGH[SDQGXQFRQVFLRXVELDVHGXFDWLRQ´
We Pledge to Act On Supporting More Inclusive Workplaces!, CEO ACTION FOR DIVERSITY &
INCLUSION, https://www.ceoaction.com/the-pledge/ [https://perma.cc/6PPP-5A2H] (last visited Aug. 
30, 2018); Bonnie Marcus, What Happens When CEOs Take a Pledge to Improve Diversity and 




160. BMO FIN. GRP., 2016 EMPLOYMENT EQUITY NARRATIVE REPORT 9 (2016) 
https://www.bmo.com/cr/files/NarrativeReport2016EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5US-68JD]. 
161. Id.
162. Jessica Guynn, Facebook Combats Bias with Training, USA TODAY (July 28, 2015, 1:17 
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/07/28/facebook-unconscious-bias-training-sheryl-
sandberg/30762747/ [https://perma.cc/X3JQ-7K3W]. 
163. See infra Section IV.A. 
164. See infra Section IV.B. 
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566 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:539 
business-led targets and corporate board diversity task forces to help foster 
cooperation and address structural gender diversity issues.165
A.  Improved Trainings 
Diversity trainings are the most common component of diversity programs, 
and are often prompted by the desire to avoid discrimination lawsuits and 
negative publicity.166  As such, many companies will likely continue trainings 
in spite of potential flaws.  However, they can improve trainings by 
incorporating proven implicit bias interventions and by offering voluntary 
trainings to directors and officers.  Recognizing that mere awareness-raising is 
not enough,167 they can enhance trainings by arming participants with specific 
board-oriented tools to reduce bias and its effects.168  The results of these 
trainings for directors and officers should also be tested and the trainings should 
be adjusted accordingly.169
First, companies should offer the trainings to important insiders, including 
directors and officers.  These trainings should start during new director and 
officer orientation and occur on an ongoing basis to increase long-term 
effectiveness.170  The participation of decision makers is an important part of 
implicit bias training.171  Not only do directors and officers make personnel and 
governance decisions that are susceptible to implicit bias, but they have the 
ability to set the tone at the top.  Setting the tone of changing corporate culture 
to eliminate bias is critical.172  Research indicates that individuals who feel 
165. See infra Section IV.C. 
166. Diversity Management, supra note 153, at 21, 26±27.  
167. See Adam Grant & Sheryl Sandberg, When Talking About Bias Backfires, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/opinion/sunday/adam-grant-and-sheryl-sandberg-on-
discrimination-at-work.html [https://perma.cc/EHX6-Q7C8] (explaining that merely raising 
awareness about bias is not only ineffective, but could also be counterproductive, leading to more 
stereotyping of others). 
168. See Joelle Emerson, Don’t Give Up on Unconscious Bias Training—Make it Better, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Apr. 28, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/04/dont-give-up-on-unconscious-bias-training-make-
it-better [https://perma.cc/R29W-PDMA]. 
169. See BOHNET supra note 127, at 59±³,FDQQRWRYHUVWDWHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWHVWing and 
mHDVXULQJZKDWZRUNVDQGZKDWGRHVQRW´
170. Levinson, supra note 76, at 163. 
171. Id.; BROWN, supra note 51, at 24 (suggesting that workplace diversity trainings are most 
HIIHFWLYHZKHQ FXVWRPL]HG WR³IRFXV RQ RUJDQL]DWLRQDO FKDQJH DQG WKH UROH RI WKH OHDGHU LQ WDNLQJ
FRQFUHWHVWHSVWROHDGWKHFRQYHUVDWLRQDERXWLQFOXVLRQ´
172. BROWN, supra note 51, at 32.  Relatedly, many activist CEOs already make their voices 
heard on social issues, particularly when the issue touches on corporate values.  For example, in 2016 
PayPal CEO Dan Schulman spoke out against a North Carolina law requiring individuals to use 
bathrooms that correspond to the gender on their birth certificates. Aaron K. Chatterji & Michael W. 
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concern about discrimination are able to apply their knowledge of bias-reducing 
strategies into action.173  These trainings should also be voluntary, as research 
shows that mandatory trainings can create backlash.174
Next, as described in Part III, research shows the potential of bias-reducing 
strategies, such as stereotype replacement, counter-stereotypic imaging, and 
perspective-taking.175 Since new research is constantly emerging regarding 
implicit bias and the effectiveness of various interventions aimed at reducing it, 
trainings should incorporate strategies that have been tested and proven.  Along 
with research-informed content, firms can use a number of effective methods 
to structure their director and officer implicit bias trainings.  One model focuses 
on implicit bias as a habit than can be broken through being aware of bias, 
having concern about the consequences and motivation to change, and applying 
strategies to reduce it.176  Another possibility is an approach by Paradigm 
Strategy, Inc., a firm that advises companies on diversity.177  This method 
prescribes that companies (1) design trainings to reduce defensiveness while 
communicating the importance of addressing bias, (2) structure trainings 
around specific situations, such as recruiting, hiring, and team dynamics, and 
 PDNH WUDLQLQJV ³DFWLRQ RULHQWHG´ LQFOXGLQJ GLVFXVVLRQ RI ³ZKDW
qualifications matter before making people-UHODWHGGHFLVLRQV´178
To make trainings geared toward directors and governance, trainings should 
incorporate tasks the board²especially the nominating and governance 
committee²faces, such as recruiting nominees and engaging in discussion and 
decision-making.  The trainings should equip participants with tools to work 
around the presence of unconscious bias in these tasks.  This will help avoid the 
automatic, intuitive judgments that are vulnerable to biases.179  For example, 
trainings could include discussion of how top executives and directors can 
consistently utilize sophisticated data analytics and objective guidelines and 
Toffel, The New CEO Activists, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.±Feb. 2018, at 78, 78±89.  Research 
increasingly indicates that millennials believe CEOs have a responsibility to raise awareness on social 
issues, although consumer surveys show that Americans approve of CEO activism on economic issues 
more than social issues. Id.
173. Supra Section III.B.1, pp. 554±56. 
174. Diversity Management, supra note 153, at 26. 
175. Supra Section III.B.1, p. 555. 
176. See Jessica Nordell, Is This How Discrimination Ends?, THE ATLANTIC (May 7, 2017) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/05/unconscious-bias-training/525405/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y389-RBG5]; Devine et al., supra note 95, at 1268; Carnes et al., supra note 95, at 
228. 
177. Emerson, supra note 168. 
178. Id.
179. See BROWN, supra note 51, at 10±11.  
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568 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:539 
assessments for potential board nominees.  When incorporating objective 
assessments in the selection of board nominees, it is also important that board 
nominating committees avoid criteria that traditionally exclude women, such as 
only prior CEOs or individuals with prior board experience.180
For the many companies with diversity trainings already in place, it would 
not be difficult to make modifications to reflect current research and to provide 
trainings to directors and officers that address board-specific issues. The 
growing number of unconscious bias trainings offered to senior managers in 
recent years has already begun to encourage companies to expand their 
diversity trainings.  Expanding implicit bias trainings at the board level simply 
takes this one step further.  Companies should have an incentive to take these 
steps in order to better ensure qualified candidates can earn board seats.   
While improved trainings are a crucial part of overcoming bias, trainings 
alone are likely not enough to make a marked difference in breaking down 
barriers.  However, training can be effective when combined with other 
structural efforts to confront implicit bias.181  As such, I propose additional 
measures to foster accountability182 and encourage intergroup cooperation.183
B.  Identity- and Training-Based Disclosures 
The SEC should modify its disclosure rule in three ways to address implicit 
bias.  First, the rule should define diversity in a way that expressly includes 
gender diversity.184  This is important because the first step to addressing 
implicit gender bias on boards is recognizing a definition of diversity that 
unambiguously includes gender.  Second, the rule should require companies to 
disclose whether they have implemented unconscious bias trainings for 
directors and officers as part of a corporate diversity policy.  Third, as others 
have suggested, the rule should require disclosure of the demographic 
composition of directors and top executives.185  These changes acknowledge 
180. Cunningham, supra note 126.   
181. Emerson, supra note 168. 
182. Infra Sections IV.B, IV.C.1.  
183. Infra Section IV.C.2. 
184. See Rachel Orbach, Note, Bringing Talent off the Bench and into the Game: The 
Underrepresentation of Women in the Boardroom, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 255 (2017). 
185. Letter from Stephen M. Graham, Comm. Co-Chair, and Sara Hanks, Comm. Co-Chair,  to 
Michael S. Piwowar, supra note 36.  Moreover, for regulated entities with more than 100 employees, 
this disclosure would be relatively simple since they are already required to file a report on diversity 
in the workplace under Title VII. EEO-1: Who Must File, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM¶N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/whomustfile.cfm [https://perma.cc/U457-XRFS] (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2018); Sample Employer Information Report EEO-1, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
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2018] BIAS IN THE BOARDROOM 569 
the potential role of implicit gender bias (and more generally, identity-based 
bias) in board composition and in the nomination process, instead of assuming 
that a gender-neutral process exists.   
The SEC has begun to recognize related types of disclosure with the 
implementation of its nonbinding policy statement on joint standards for 
assessing diversity policies of regulated entities.186  Starting in January 2018, 
the SEC now encourages regulated entities WRVXEPLWD³GLYHUVLW\DVVHVVPHQW
UHSRUW´ZLWKUHOHYDQWLQIRUPDWLRQabout their diversity policies, including the 
existence of diversity training and steps taken to promote diversity when 
selecting members of the board.187  However, submitting the report is only 
voluntary.188  As such, the suggested disclosure modifications in this Article go 
a step further by requiring certain additional disclosures and focusing on 
unconscious bias.  
The first benefit of these changes is transparency.  Currently, the rule loses 
effectiveness because of its ambiguity.189  In leaving diversity undefined, the 
rule obscures the need to eliminate identity-based obstacles such as implicit 
gender bias.  Instead, diversity becomes just a meaningless narrative.190  Each 
of the suggested disclosures²defining diversity and disclosing the 
demographic composition of directors and officers and whether diversity 
trainings are provided²creates greater transparency in how companies 
consider diversity in the nomination process.191  This is important because for 
COMM¶N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/upload/eeo1-2-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9TR-
SDK4] (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).  
186. Final Interagency Policy Statement Establishing Joint Standards for Assessing the Diversity 
Policies and Practices of Entities Regulated by the Agencies, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,016, 30,016 (June 10, 
2015).  
187. OFF. OF MINORITY & WOMEN INCLUSION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM¶N, DIVERSITY 
ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR ENTITIES REGULATED BY THE SEC 1 (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/OMWI-DAR-FORM.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RQW-KAPL]; SEC Invites 
Regulated Entities to Voluntarily Submit Self-Assessment of Diversity Policies and Practices, U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM¶N (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-7 
[https://perma.cc/G5DB-H94L].  Some of the voluntary disclosures the SEC seeks are whether the firm 
offers training and education on diversity and inclusion and whether the firm promotes diverse 
candidates when selecting board nominees. Id.
188. SEC Invites Regulated Entities to Voluntarily Submit Self-Assessment of Diversity Policies 
and Practices, supra note 187.  
189. DHIR, supra note 34, at 231.   
190. See Lissa L. Broome et al., Dangerous Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board 
Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 761, 764 (2011) (describing a set of interviews about board diversity 
in which corporate insiders universally described the importance of diversity, but were unable to 
elaborate on contributions of female or minority directors or even acknowledge the impact of gender, 
race, and ethnicity). 
191. See Michaels, supra note 36.  
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GLVFORVXUH UXOHV WR EH HIIHFWLYH WKH\ PXVW KDYH ³VLPSOH salient, and 
FRPSDUDWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQ´192
Next, these modifications can help reduce bias indirectly.  When the law 
SURKLELWV RU SHUPLWV EHKDYLRU LW LQGLUHFWO\ ³FUHDWHV LQFHQWLYHV RU DYRLGs
disincentives) for regulated actors to adopt a debiasing approach.´193  Thus, a 
rule requiring disclosure of whether directors and officers participate in 
unconscious bias trainings can encourage companies to implement trainings 
and other bias-reducing actions.194  Moreover, rather than continuing to treat 
diversity as an empty narrative, companies are encouraged to consider how the 
director nomination process is not gender neutral.195
Another benefit of these changes is accountability.  When actors must 
explain their choices²such as how corporations consider gender diversity and 
whether they offer unconscious bias trainings²they may be less likely to rely 
on stereotypes.196  Evidence shows that actors who know they will be held 
accountable will weaken cognitive biases prior to making decisions.197
Furthermore, this type of disclosure is a nod to research findings that a 
counterproductive bias-reduction strategy is stereotype suppression, or trying 
to be gender blind.198  Research shows that stereotype suppression may work to 
control explicit stereotyping, but it has negative effects on implicit 
stereotyping.199  By recognizing that we are not a gender-blind society,200 these 
disclosures could bring more awareness of bias barriers that persist.    
Critics will point out problems with disclosure as a means to address 
implicit bias on boards.  One issue is lack of clarity.  Relatedly, the effectiveness 
of transparency depends on an interested public to demand change, and for 
192. BOHNET, supra note 127, at 278, 283. 
193. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 75, at 985. 
194. See id. at 986±87.   
195. See Broome et al., supra note 190, at 777±78; Wade, supra note 137, at 30, 33.  
196. See BOHNET, supra note 127, at 280 (citing Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, 
Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 259 (1999)). 
197. See id. DW   5HODWHG WR DFFRXQWDELOLW\ LV WKH ³H[SUHVVLYH IXQFWLRQ´ RI WKLV NLQG RI
disclosure law, which can shape norms to break down implicit stereotypes. Cass R. Sunstein, On the 
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024±25 (1996); see DHIR, supra note 34, at 
219±28. 
198. Carnes et al., supra note 95, at 223. 
199. Galinsky & Moskowitz, supra note 99, at 721 (describing results of a study in which 
stereotype suppression had a negative impact on implicit stereotyping whereas taking the perspective 
of the target individual has potential benefits in reducing stereotyping). 
200. POMERANTZ & RABY, supra QRWHDW³$OWKRXJKSRVW-feminism erases the possibility 
of sexism by insisting that girls are living in a gender-neutral world, sexism still abounds in all areas 
RIVRFLDOOLIHDQGDWDOOOHYHOVRISRZHU´see Ramirez, supra note 124, at 1583.   
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leaders to respond to such demands.201  However, these modifications²
defining diversity, providing demographic information of directors and 
officers, and disclosing whether implicit bias trainings exist²help clarify 
diversity information and prompt investors and the public to understand the 
implications of the disclosure.   
Another problem may be that certain disclosures could be seen as 
inconsistent with the purpose of securities laws.  When disclosure is used to 
³VKDPHLVVXHUVDZD\IURPRWKHUZLVHXQUHJXODWHGFRQGXFW>@´ LWGHSDUWVIURP
the goal of investor protection.202  It would provide nonmaterial information to 
investors who may be indifferent to diversity.203  However, many investors, 
particularly funds that promote women in leadership, do care about gender 
diversity.204  It is also not unusual for disclosure laws to seek desired conduct.205
C.  Diversity Task Forces and Voluntary Targets 
A greater emphasis on training and modified disclosures will help ensure a 
gender-neutral nomination process and work to reduce implicit bias on boards.  
In addition, voluntary, business-led efforts should aim to (1) address the role of 
implicit bias on board diversity through task forces, and (2) increase women 
directors to reflect critical mass research.  Companies should seek to implement 
targets and task forces because they will help ensure corporate governance is 
free of bias.  These measures will also promote transparency and accountability, 
which can help shape a culture that will overcome biases.  
1.  Diversity Task Forces  
Companies should engage in voluntary efforts to tackle implicit bias.  
Specifically, firm task forces and similar initiatives should address how implicit 
201. BROWN, supra note 51, at 13±14 (suggesting the limitations of transparency when 
companies simply share demographic data in order bring change in the numbers). 
202. DHIR, supra note 34, at 86. 
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Women in Leadership Fund, GLENMEDE INV. MGMT LP (2016), 
https://www.glenmede.com/files/women-in-leadership-gwilx-factsheet-2q2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8C28-PGP7] (investing in companies with women in senior leadership roles, 
including women on the board); PAX ELLEVATE, http://paxworld.com/pax-ellevate/ 
[https://perma.cc/9U8V-443S] (last visited Oct. 19, 2017) (investing in companies with high ratings of 
advancing women in leadership). 
205. See, e.g., Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,105 (Aug. 18, 2015) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R pts. 229, 240, 249).  The rule requiring issuers to disclose the ratio of median compensation 
of all employees to the compensation of the CEO was designed to allow shareholders to hold 
companies accountable for executive compensation and to examine the relationship between pay and 
performance. 
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bias is a barrier to women in leadership.  The benefit of a task force is social 
accountability and the ability to engage perspectives of company leaders who 
³EHJLQWRWKLQNRIWKHPVHOYHVDVGLYHUVLW\FKDPSLRQV´206  Dobbin and Kalev 
note the effectiveness of social accountability within diversity task forces 
because of the mutual monitoring that occurs.207  Companies with diversity task 
forces have seen a 9% to 30% increase in representation of women in 
management.208
As such, firms should create task forces encouraging directors and officers 
to investigate implicit bias and related diversity concerns in the company.  
These efforts may range from board nomination to mentorship and sponsorship 
of women.  Along with creating programs that prepare women in senior 
PDQDJHPHQW WR ³EHFRPH ERDUG-UHDG\´ WDVN IRUFHV VKRXOG HQFRXUDJH VHQLRU
executives to mentor and sponsor qualified women for board seats.209  Engaging 
executives this way recognizes the interconnectedness of advancing women in 
leadership.  Not only can CEOs influence board appointments, but evidence 
shows that when women serve on boards, women are also more likely to 
advance in managerial roles.210  Task forces should also meet periodically to 
implement company-specific tools to address the role of bias.  These tools may 
include objective assessments and criteria to select board candidates and data 
analytics to pinpoint barriers. 
Ideally, diversity task forces will include men, women, and other 
minorities. This has the benefit of fostering personal connections amongst 
members of different groups, which research indicates can reduce bias.  
Diversity task forces may also promote exposure to out-group members, 
perspective-taking, and counter-stereotypic imaging²all strategies that have 
shown the ability to moderate bias.  
206. Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 135, at 57.  
207. Id. at 60. 
208. Id.
209. GAO REPORT, supra note 117, at 20; see also, e.g., Catalyst Women on Board, CATALYST,
http://www.catalyst.org/catalystwomenonboard [https://perma.cc/P43S-3Q88] (last visited Dec. 13, 
2017).
210. Sheryl Skaggs et al., Shaking Things Up or Business as Usual? The Influence of Female 
Corporate Executives and Board of Directors on Women’s Managerial Representation, 41 J. SOC. SCI.
RES. 936, 937 (2012); Stefanie K. Johnson & Kimberly Davis, CEOs Explain How They Gender-
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2. Voluntary Targets  
Companies should also implement targets to increase the number of women 
directors to reach a critical mass.  Voluntary targets are an important element 
of tackling biased structures because the presence of more women directors can 
help moderate implicit bias.  Adopting targets to increase gender diversity can 
address tokenism and implicit bias in the boardroom by way of having a critical 
mass of women directors.  More women on the board may also increase 
exposure to counter-stereotypical exemplars, encourage perspective-taking, 
and promote contact with out-group members²all recognized bias-reducing 
strategies.211
Making board diversity targets public and working together will increase 
accountability.  The United Kingdom found success with voluntary targets in 
2011 when the government worked with business leaders to adopt 
recommendations to increase women on boards.212  After achieving the initial 
goal of increasing women on FTSE 350 boards to 25%, the new target became 
increasing representation to 33%.213  Similar voluntary targets for U.S. 
companies could also be successful.  Some large companies including Intel, 
Google, and Apple have taken the lead by implementing diversity goals and 
disclosing workforce numbers in terms of race, ethnicity, and gender.214
Moreover, targets can be impactful if they reinforce a message of 
engagement.  Therefore, it is important to engage the perspectives of relevant 
stakeholders including managers, directors, shareholders, search firms, 
government leaders, and other experts.215  Indeed, a report from the Business 
Roundtable, an association of CEOs of leading U.S. companies, suggests an 
increased willingness to form coalitions that encourage board diversity 
policies.216  Natural partners also include the nonprofit organizations working 
211. See supra Section III.B.1; see also DHIR, supra note 34, at 288. 
212. GAO REPORT, supra note 117, at 7. 
213. WOMEN ON BOARDS DAVIES REVIEW, IMPROVING THE GENDER BALANCE ON BRITISH 
BOARDS 7 (2015); GAO REPORT, supra note 117, at 7; see also Zoe Wood & Tom Bawden, Inquiry 
Calls for More Women in Boardroom, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 24, 2011), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/feb/24/davies-inquiry-women-boardroom-targets-quotas 
[https://perma.cc/23DG-CZGY].   
214. BARRIERS AND BIAS, supra note 74, at 31; Manjoo, supra note 150.  
215. See GAO REPORT, supra note 117, at 7.
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to increase the percentage of women on boards, including Catalyst, 2020: 
Women on Boards, and the 30% Club.217
Through these collaborative, voluntary targets, gender equality can start to 
become a reality in corporate cultures. 
V. CONCLUSION
 Board diversity advocates and the business community alike should not 
ignore the role of implicit gender bias in the selection of board nominees and 
in the boardroom.  Companies should take advantage of continuing research on 
bias-reduction strategies and other structural tools to overcome implicit bias in 
recruiting board nominees and in boardroom dynamics.  Improved trainings for 
directors and officers, modified disclosures, and meaningful voluntary action 
by companies are each part of the solution.  Once companies recognize the 
importance of overcoming implicit bias in the selection process and in the 
boardroom, they can begin to overcome the visible and invisible obstacles that 
qualified women encounter.   
217. About Us, 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, https://www.2020wob.com/about 
[https://perma.cc/SE53-S5DP] (last visited Dec. 12, 2017); About, 30% CLUB,
https://us.30percentclub.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/94XM-QPEV] (last visited Dec. 12, 2017). 
